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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
whether or not damages will make the plaintiff whole
again. Accordingly, little justification can be seen for mak-
ing stocks, bonds, and other evidences of indebtedness a
separate class of chattels.
It is submitted that the Court should conform to the
general rule as to the specific recovery of chattels, as was
done in Farmer v. O'Carroll, and refuse to grant relief, un-
less some special circumstances are shown making the legal
remedy inadequate. It is regrettable, however, that the
earlier cases establishing a different rule should not have
been mentioned and definitely overruled. The silence of
the Court in this respect leaves the present status of these
cases, as well as the applicable rule as to equitable juris-
diction, in considerable doubt.
WHAT DETERMINES DOMICIL
Gaver v. County Commissioners For Frederick County.
In the Matter of Charles Delmar'
This is an appeal taken by the Supervisor of Assess-
ments for Frederick County to the State Tax Commission
from the failure of the County Commissioners for that
county to assess the intangible property tax on some $300,
000 of securities for the years 1936, 1937 and 1938, reported
as being owned by Charles Delmar, a registered voter of
Frederick County. There was no written record of the
proceedings and the Tax Commission assumed that the
County Commissioners refused to enter an assessment on
the basis that Mr. Delmar was not a resident of Frederick
County.
The undisputed evidence showed that Charles Delmar
was born in New York. For many years prior to 1924 he
was a resident of Maryland, but in that year he left the
State and resided in New York until 1927 when he moved
to Washington, D. C. In 1931 Mr. Delmar married and
afterward resided in a home in Washington, which was
reputed to be worth much more than the assessed value
of $62,000. Mr. Delmar maintained offices in Washington
and was the principal owner of eight or nine financial en-
terprises. The home telephone was listed in Mrs. Del-
mar's name. Three automobiles were licensed by the Dis-
1 Baltimore Daily Record, January 23, 1939 (Md. St. Tax Comm. 1939).
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trict of Columbia and one, used principally in Frederick
County, was registered in Maryland. His passport, issued
in 1937, gave Washington as his residence as did his will,
executed in 1937. When traveling Mr. Delmar gave Wash-
ington as his residence. He had paid intangible property
taxes in Washington for many years. His step-children at-
tended preparatory school in Washington.
In May, 1935, Mr. Delmar purchased a 115 acre farm
containing a dwelling house and outbuildings in Peters-
ville or Knoxville, Frederick County. The property was
assessed at $30,000. The farm was leased on shares to
tenants who worked it. Mr. Delmar and his family used
the farm for week-ends from about April to November
when it was closed for the winter. Altogether the farm
was used about thirty days out of the year. A staff of
servants was maintained at the Washington home, only
a few of which were occasionally needed at the farm. By
comparison, on the other hand, the Washington house was
kept open the entire year and Mr. Delmar's step-son made
his home there at all times. In 1935 Mr. Delmar filed his
declaration of intention of becoming a citizen of Maryland,
and he voted in Maryland in the Congressional election
of 1936 and in the general election of 1938. Held: Charles
Delmar was domiciled in Washington, D. C.
The Maryland tax law defines resident as "... every
person domiciled in this state on the last day of the tax-
able year, and every other person who, for more than
six months of the taxable year, maintained his place of
abode within this state, whether domiciled in this state or
not .... 2 Since Mr. Delmar did not live in Maryland for
six months or more in the taxable year, the question de-
cided at the hearing was whether he was domiciled in
Maryland.3
To all intents Charles Delmar was a resident of Wash-
ington; his year-round home was there, always open; his
business was there; his step-children attended school there;
2 Md. Laws (Sp. Session) 1937, Ch. 11, Sec. 8 (215h).
3 In the light of recent Supreme Court cases (Curry v. McCanless, 307
U. S. 357, 83 L. Ed. 865, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939) ; Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S.
383, 83 L. Ed. 880, 59 S. Ct. 913 (1939); Schuylkill Trust Company v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 U. S. 506, 82 L. Ed. 392, 58 S. Ct.
295 (1937); First Bank Stock Corporation v. State of Minnesota, 301
U. S. 234, 81 L. Ed. 1061, 57 S. Ct. 677 (1936); Wheeling Steel Corpora-
tion v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 80 L. Ed. 1143, 56 S. Ct. 773 (1936) ; First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 76 L. Ed. 313,
52 S. Ct. 174 (1932)), involving double taxation, the importance of domicil
as one of the focal points of taxation is apparent.
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this is where he returned after traveling abroad, where he
entertained his friends and where they in turn considered
him to live. On the other hand, certain factors were urged
as making him a resident of Maryland, i. e. his declara-
tion of 1937 to the tax authorities of the District of Colum-
bia that he was a resident of Maryland; his Maryland In-
come Tax return for 1937 giving Knoxville as his resi-
dence; his voting in Maryland; his acceptance of an ap-
pointment as Regent of the University of Maryland (an
office limited by statute to citizens of Maryland); and his
close affiliation with local political activity.
Domicil has been defined in various ways. The Mary-
land Court in Brafman v. Brafman4 quoted the definition
given in Mitchell v. United States: ". . a residence at a
particular place accompanied with positive or presumptive
proof of an intention to remain there for an unlimited
time."
In discussing, in another case, whether a party to the
suit had been served in the proper place the Maryland
Court said: 5
"The statute contemplates the permanent fixed
home of the party, whither when the objects of tem-
porary absence . . . were accomplished the person
turned for social life; where his family, if he had one,
usually dwelt; to which his mind turns when away,
and where he has the present purpose of returning
and remaining. It is not the place where a man hap-
pens to be temporarily residing, even though it be
with his family; for a man may for convenience sake,
have a temporary residence and quasi-home, which is
not his home and residence proper; and unless he has
abandoned the latter for the former, with intention of
permanently remaining from it, the newly chosen resi-
dence is not his domicile."
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws says 6 "domicil is
the place with which a person has a settled connection for
certain legal purposes, either because his home is there,
or because that place is assigned to him by the law," but
in later sections it indicates that man's home, in the nor-
'Brafman v. Brafman, 144 Md. 413, 414, 125 A. 161 (1924); Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws, Md. Annot. (1936) Sec. 9.
5 Tyler v. Murray, 57 Md. 418, 442 (1881); Restatement. Conflict of
Laws, Md. Annot. (1936) Sec. 9.
6 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) See. 9.
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mal sense of the word, is usually determinative of domicil.'
Observing the facts in this case in the light of the above
definitions it is evident that Washington and not Mary-
land was the domicil of Mr. Delmar, at least prior to 1935,
and nothing happened after 1935 to change this domicil
in the light of recognized principles of law. Two things
are necessary to change one's domicil: (1) the acquisition
of a new residence (in the sense of physical presence in
the new jurisdiction), and (2) the intention of making the
last-acquired residence a permanent home.8
Let us consider the acquisition of the farm in Fred-
erick County in the light of the above factors. It was pur-
chased with the intent to use it only for week-ends dur-
ing a few months of the year. On the other hand, the
Washington establishment was never closed, one mem-
ber of the family always resided there, and there was no
indication of an intent to make the Frederick County place
a permanent home. Even if Mr. Delmar intended to re-
move his domicil to Maryland, he had not done so as he
had not abandoned his former domicil in Washington.
Statements and declarations made by Mr. Delmar to
the effect that he intended to have a Maryland domicil
would not be conclusive. For certain purposes Mr. Del-
mar, so far as the District of Columbia was concerned,
wished it to appear that he was domiciled in Maryland.
He did everything in his power to this end. This is borne
out by his statement to the various tax authorities and by
his voting in that state. But, Maryland cases and cases
from other jurisdictions have indicated that actions speak
louder than words with reference to determining his in-
tention to acquire a new domicil, and that voting residence
is not conclusive of domicil.
In the recent case of Wagner v. Scurlock ° a winter
home was maintained in Washington while the family
moved to Maryland for the summer. The franchise right
was exercised in Maryland after suitable declarations had
been made. The Court, in holding Washington to be the
I Ibid., Secs. 12-13, 18-19, 24; and Ibid., Md. Annot. (1936). Cf. Hill
v. Board of Registry, 171 Md. 653, 187 A. 869 (1937).
8 Restatment, Conflict of Laws, Md. Annot. (1936) Sec. 15.
0 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 19; and Ibid., Md. Annot.
(1936).
10 Wagner v. Scurlock, 166 Md. 284, 170 A. 539 (193). See also, on
the question of domicil under the non-resident motorists statute, Judge
Chesnut's opinion in Suit v. Shaler, et al., 18 Fed. Supp. 568 (D. C. Md.
1937).
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domicil (for the purpose of asserting jurisdiction through
service under the non-resident motorists statute), said:
"While the exercise of the elective franchise is of impor-
tance in determining domicil, it is not conclusive, and when
overbalanced by other circumstances it may be of slight
importance." Later the Court in discussing the declara-
tions as to residence in Maryland said: "While intention
is the controlling factor in determining domicile, this may
be more satisfactorily shown by what is done than by what
is said."
The Maryland Court of Appeals has also said: "In
questions of residence the intention of the party with re-
gard to maintaining his right to vote is admissible though
not conclusive."" To hold otherwise would be to allow
one actually to live (for all practical purposes) in X State
and, because Y State is more advantageous from the tax
standpoint, to make certain declarations for his own pur-
poses and vote accordingly and by this voting be taxed in
Y State and not in X State, which is actually his domicil.
To change one's domicil, a desire to make a home in fact
must exist and not merely the wish to have the advantage
of the legal consequences of the new place. 12
This point was discussed in 1935 by the New York
Court of Appeals. 13 Mr. Trowbridge, although he owned
residential property in New York City, actually lived with
his family in Connecticut. For reasons known to himself
he wished to be classified as a resident of New York. He
sought legal advice and was told, ". . . that it is mainly a
matter of intention of the man himself, and that the first
thing to do was to describe himself in writings and instru-
ments as a resident of the State of New York." Mr. Trow-
bridge followed his attorney's advice religiously, giving
New York as his residence in his will, making declarations
to the taxing authorities of both Connecticut and New
York, and voting in New York. Notwithstanding all of
this, the Court of Appeals of New York in a dispute be-
tween New York and Connecticut as to which should tax
the estate for death tax purposes held that Mr. Trowbridge
was domiciled in Connecticut.
In another case the taxpayer had moved with his family
from New Jersey to Pennsylvania but still wished to be
11 Harrison v. Harrison, 117 Md. 607, 84 A. 57 (1912).
12 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 19; and bid., Md. Annot.
(1986).
" In re Trowbridge's Estate, 266 N. Y. 283, 194 N. P .756 (1935).
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considered as domiciled in New Jersey for tax purposes
and accordingly made declarations to that effect. The
Pennsylvania court in holding him domiciled in Pennsyl-
vania said: "Apart from possible exceptions a man cannot
retain a domicile in one place when he has moved to an-
other and intends to reside there for the rest of his life, by
any wish, declaration or intent inconsistent with the domi-
nant facts of where he actually lives and what he actually
means to do .... Every person must have a domicil some-
where and a man cannot elect to make his home in one
place for the general purposes of life, and in another place
for the purpose of taxation."' 4
It is evident, therefore, that the courts will look behind
declarations and the place of suffrage to the facts, and de-
cide the question of domicil not on what is said by the tax-
payer to suit his own purposes but on what he actually
does. The same reasoning is equally sound in the question
of the public office held by Mr. Delmar in Maryland. Al-
though it is evidence of domicil, it is not conclusive, and,
just as in the case of declarations and suffrage, the Court
will seek to find the permanent and actual home.
The Restatement says that where X has the capacity to
acquire two homes the earlier one is his domicil unless he
considers the later one his principal home.1 Maryland is
in accord with this in a group of cases involving a winter
residence in Washington and a summer residence in Mary-
land.16 The instant ruling seems only to have followed
these correct principles of domicil.
"In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932).
15 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 24.
16Ibid., and Ibid., Md. Annot. (1936).
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